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Kuhn's Model of Revolutionary Science:
Evidence for a Coherence Criteria of Truth

The traditional view in analytic philosophy concerning scientific progress and the
justification of scientific theory is characterized by four central tenets:
(i) Realism. There exists one mind-independent reality, and it is the scientist's goal
to derive true theories which accurately describe that reality.
(ii) Science is cumulative. Scientific endeavors are thought to produce a cumulative
body of knowledge, where each new theoretical or methodological addition builds
upon and subsumes what is already known.
(iii) Theory-neutral observation. Scientific activity employs observations which are
distinct and independent from theory; and such observations are the mediating basis
upon which theories are upheld or rejected, and upon which competing theories are
compared.
(iv) Standards ofjustification. There exist underlying scientific standards which,
together with observations, provide the rationale for the justification of scientific
theories and propositions; and these standards are rigid and fixed, allowing for
rational evaluations of all scientific theory.
These four points represent a characterization of science that enjoys widespread
acceptance within the scientific and philosophical community. This view depicts science as an
ever-advancing process of discovery guided by rational standards ofjustification and a rigorous
methodology of theory-neutral observation and investigation. Alongside this view of science is a
correspondence based picture of truth and knowledge. Deriving from the realism assumption,
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truth is correspondence to reality. For some proposition to be true is just for its contents to
accurately describe the relevant portion of independent reality. Further, in accordance with tenets
(iii) and (iv), the methodology employed to check the truth of statements about reality requires a
comparison of theory content and neutral observation in strict accordance with the appropriate
rational standards of investigation and justification. Under this view, truth is correspondence, and
knowledge of reality is accessible through observation. In addition, for those who subscribe to
this traditional characterization, there is one correct description of the world, which scientists seek
to discover. Although focused upon the sciences, this model provides the prototype for all
epistemic inquiry for many in analytic philosophy.
One alternative view to this general scientific and epistemic picture is derivable from the
work ofT.S. Kuhn, who approaches science from an historical perspective and argues that the
practice of science does not actually support the traditional analysis. He therefore forwards a
view that subverts the traditional understanding of science and knowledge. Kuhn's model of
revolutionary science provides strong evidence and convincing argumentation against the
traditional doctrine that judgments of truth are based upon correspondence to reality, and for the
alternative view that the proper criterion of truth is coherence.

Kuhn's revolutionary science
Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (1962) challenges the traditional view by
denying three of the aforementioned core assumptions. Kuhn denies the existence of both
theory-neutral observation and rational scientific standards; and he further denies that science is
cumulative. Kuhn argues instead that science, which admits of several distinct phases, or periods,
is better characterized as producing a body of knowledge which "shifts" in content according to
the emergence and subsequent destruction of incompatible -- in fact incommensurable -
paradigms, which guide all of "normal" science. A paradigm is best understood as a holistic
theoretical and practical matrix which dictates the accepted "law, theory, application, and
instrumentation" for a specified scientific field, and also "provides models from which spring
particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (Kuhn, 10). Examples of such traditions
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include 'Ptolemaic astronomy', and 'Newtonian physics'. ''Normal'' science is the activity
undertaken within the framework of such a tradition. According to Kuhn there are five cyclical
phases of science: pre-paradigm science, normal science, crisis science, paradigm rejection and
revolution, and finally new paradigm establishment, after which normal science resumes and the
cycle repeats itself
Prior to the establishment of a paradigm, scientific endeavor is characterized by Kuhn as
being largely occupied with the activity of "random fact gathering," as there is no theoretical basis
to guide investigation; also, what datum are collected within a given field are "likely to seem
equally relevant" because there is no rational basis upon which to differentiate between important
or promising observations and those which are not truly germane to the given field (Kuhn, 15).
Moreover, before a paradigm is in place, there is little consensus between practitioners of a given
discipline, which usually results in several factional theoretical schools, none of which can boast
any explanatory achievements over competitors.
Kuhn argues that a paradigm generally emerges from among such competing schools as
the result of a particularly attractive or powerful accomplishment that places one school in a
better position than the others. With the establishment and common acceptance of one particular
theoretical structure, researchers can direct their observations and experiments in accordance with
the ontological and methodological landscape provided by the agreed upon paradigm. Under
such guidance, scientists are in a position to judge the value of various observations, and delineate
between important lines of investigation and those without promise. Thus normal science, in
contrast to its "immature" precursor, is characterized as purposeful, directed, and capable of
advancement just in light of the fact that a paradigm exists as a qualifying standard.
Kuhn argues that a paradigm directs normal science by setting out the parameters of the
given field; the paradigm fixes the theoretical structure, methods, experiments, and the problems
to be solved. Accordingly, normal science, which accepts a paradigm, is not concerned with
theory verification or falsification, but rather with fitting nature to the paradigm through theory
articulation and the production of more sophisticated experiments. In so much as science is
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normalized within a paradigm, the respective theoretical structure simply is not open to debate, as
this structure must be assumed as correct if normal science is to proceed.
In this sense, normal science is chiefly concerned with puzzle solving. The relevant
paradigm dictates what has been "figured out" and what areas still prove problematic. Kuhn
argues that these scientific "puzzles" are what drive the scientist. What is important to note is
that implicit in the motivation to solve puzzles is the firm belief that the answer can be had.
Scientists are driven to solve the problems that the paradigm demands because they believe that
the accepted theories involved are essentially correct.
In addition to fixing the theoretical and methodological framework, paradigms
consequently affect the scientist's metaphysical picture by establishing the ontology of the
scientist's world; the contents of the world, the sorts of entities and phenomena that it contains,
are paradigm-bound. Therefore, Kuhn argues that scientists working within different paradigms
are in effect also occupying different worlds. He writes, "the historian of science may be tempted
to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world changes with them. ..In so far as their only
recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution
scientists are responding to a different world" (111). For example, phlogiston, long since
debunked, was once thought to be a legitimate ontological category. Scientists formulated an
explanatory phlogiston theory, and conducted experiments and recorded observations
accordingly. Those researchers found something in the world that scientists of today do not.
The idea of different worlds is suggestive of Kuhn' s main assertion regarding scientific
paradigms. He insists that successive paradigms are logically incompatible, and therefore do not
represent a cumulative enterprise. Kuhn employs the term "revolution" in description of the shift
from one paradigm to the next in order to emphasize this point. When one paradigm ceases to be
successful and faces an increasing number of anomalous phenomenon which cannot be explained
or ignored, a paradigm is pushed into crisis science. At this point, the paradigm begins to
breakdown, and a new theoretical system eventually moves in to take its place. Such has been the
case throughout science history; the shift from Newtonian dynamics to Einsteinian is a prime
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example. It has long been argued, and it is the majority view, that older theories, like Newton's,
are derivable from their successors, and therefore are logically included in the newer, larger
paradigm. But, if paradigms are correctly construed, this cannot be the case. A new paradigm is
established to accommodate the anomalies of the older theory. Thus, the new paradigm must
make predictions and offer explanation that the old theories did not. This being the case, the two
paradigms cannot be logically compatible. Einstein's work could only be accepted alongside the
admission that Newton was wrong.
If it is not the case that one paradigm is just an expansion of its predecessor, building upon
the previous theoretical base, then it also cannot be the case that one paradigm is adopted over
another according to rational considerations. Such criteria cannot be applied where paradigms
themselves are in question; in the absence of an accepted paradigm, there are no rational standards
by which one theory is chosen over any other. Rather, decisions between paradigms must make
appeal to extra-scientific reasons and are thus in a sense revolutionary. Kuhn furthers this
position by arguing that paradigms are incommensurable, and do not admit of discourse between
them. There are two separate arguments for the incommensurability of paradigms.

The argumentfrom theory-laden observation
Kuhn appeals to the doctrine of theory-laden observation advanced by N.R. Hanson
(1961), arguing that there is no sense in which observation can be neutral with regard to the
theoretical background of the observer. What the scientist will observe, or can observe, it fixed,
or limited by what the paradigm has established as the legitimate entities in the universe. Further,
scientists adhering to different paradigms "see" different things in the world, and make different
observations and measurements, depending upon what each paradigm demands. Scientific
observation is thus colored by the established paradigm to the extent that not only does the
scientist see what he expects to find according to a paradigm, but such scientific observation
cannot even exist without the guidance of a paradigm to make sense of raw perceptual input.
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Kuhn appeals to the extensive psychological literature of the time to further this claim; he
cites numerous observational and gestalt experiments suggesting that the perceived qualities of
experimentally displayed objects is strongly correlated with the subjects previous experience. One
type of experiment considered involves optical illusions such as the Muller-Lyer figures seen at
right. The effect of the arrows is to make
the line with the inward pointing arrows
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appear longer than the other line,
even though the lines are identical. An argument can be made that the theoretical background of
the observer, involving three-dimensional projections of convex corners, etc., must account for
the illusion, as the lines make equally long retinal imprints.
Kuhn asserts that this literature '"suggests that something like a paradigm is prerequisite to
perception itself ..what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his
previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see" (Kuhn, 113).
Thus, all observation is '"theory laden" in as much as the scientist can only make
observations which are allowed by the theoretical framework established by the paradigm to
which the scientist is committed. Two scientists working within different paradigms will actually
'"see" different objects, or features of objects, when visually confronted with the same item. In
other words, to the extent that raw perception involves the identification and categorization of
what appears in the visual field, differing paradigms will result in different observations.
From this Kuhn argues for the incommensurability of paradigms. Kuhn thinks that
adherents from different paradigms cannot communicate successfully because their theoretical
backgrounds will be sufficiently different as to exclude a common theoretical ground by which
observations can be mutually agreed upon and serve as the subject of a rational dialectic between
paradigms. According to this argument, there is no theory-neutral set of observations upon which
to base rational argumentation between paradigms.
But, there are problems with Kuhn's advancement of incommensurability to the extent that
theory-laden observation is a highly contentious thesis. JA. Fodor employs the theory-laden
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observation proponent's main evidential basis to argue against the notion that observation is
theory-bound (Fodor, 19--). As mentioned above, proponents like Hanson often refer to the
psychological experimentation on optical illusions as demonstrating the theory-Iadeness of
observation, in that optical illusions and other gestalt experiments seem to suggest that such
illusions must be explained by appealing to their reliance upon the theoretical background of the
observer. But, as Fodor points out, the knowledge that optical illusions are illusions should
negate their effect, as such knowledge is then incorporated into the theoretical background of the
observer. That such knowledge does not make optical illusions go away undermines the thesis
that observation is dependent upon theory.
Fodor offers an alternative explanation for the process of perception positing
psychological modules which are like mediating mechanisms between retinal imprints and actual
perception (Fodor,--). These mechanisms are uniquely both theory-laden and theory neutral, as
they are severely and strictly delimited with regards to what segment of the theoretical
background to which they have access. On this view, the perceptual mechanism has access to a
small portion of the theoretical background which is set early in development, the mechanism then
being in effect cut off from additional theoretical inputs. Here the segment of theory incorporated
in the perceptual module would be common to all human observers, thus providing a basis for
shared observation. Fodor's model of perception sharpens the objection made by Fodor against
Hanson and Kuhn, and is in keeping with current psychological thought.
While this is a powerful argument against the notion of theory-laden observation as
conceived of by Hanson and Kuhn, it does not necessarily refute Kuhn's theory of
incommensurability. A second line of argumentation is still available to Kuhn.

The argumentfrom theory-bound language and concepts
Even if raw observation is not necessarily theory-bound, there is still reason to think that
observational language is still heavily influenced by experience and theoretical back- ground. In
so much as observations are made public through reports, raw perception may still be filtered

8

through theory in order to be operationalized into language, thus maintaining the weakened
theory-laden thesis that observational reports and language are theory-bound. In adherence with
this weaker version, paradigms still necessarily result in a unique theory-bound language, as well
as conceptual schema. Thus scientists from different paradigms cannot effectively enter into
dialogue because they do not share a common language of observation. Along these same lines,
Fodor concedes that ''belief fixation, unlike the fixation of appearances--what I'm calling
observation--is a conservative process; to a first approximation, it uses everything you know"
(Fodor,249). In other words, one's actual observations may be neutral with regard to a large
portion of one's theoretical background, but observations are then compared with the entire
background theory in order to fix belief.
So, what scientists actually 'see' may be the same, but the beliefs which they form about what
they see may still differ.
Moreover, these difficulties are compounded by the fact that no extra- paradigmatic
conceptual standards exist to ground rational argumentation. Members of competing paradigms
will differ in opinion concerning what entities exist in the world, what counts as legitimate
scientific method and practice, and what problems should have priority, thus setting different
paradigms at cross purposes, and destroying the possibility for effective argumentation regardless
of the possibility of coherent communicative interaction. In this sense, when one scientist accuses
another of being wrong, neither is in the position to argue their point, as there is no standard to
which they both adhere; and neither can be right or wrong, as each need only answer to his own
paradigm for justification. Kuhn writes, "...the men who called Copernicus mad because he
proclaimed that the earth moved...were not either just wrong or quite wrong. Part of what they
meant by 'earth' was fixed position...a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of
scientists may... seem intuitively obvious to another" (150). Thus, scientists from different
paradigms cannot provide rational argumentation against one another because they do not share
the same conceptual language or framework.

9

This second argument in favor of incommensurability upon linguistic and conceptual
grounds is more defensible than the theory-laden observation argument, while still effectively
establishing incommensurability as a viable theory.
At this point, the objection might be raised that there will always be sufficient overlap
between different paradigms, especially at the point of transition, to allow for dialogue between
them. It simply seem eminently implausible that two scientists, working in the same field, would
be unable to communicate about their shared discipline. The problem with this objection is that it
fails to recognize a key feature of paradigms. The theoretical structure of beliefs and concepts
which constitute a paradigm is such that one altered concept or rejected belief results in an
alteration of all other concepts and beliefs. This is necessary if the paradigm as a whole is to
remain coherent. Thus, when two scientists differ on one conceptual point, they necessarily differ
on all points, although they may not explicitly realize it. Kuhn's paradigms, properly construed,
admit of no overlap, let alone sufficient overlap to allow for rational argumentation and dialogue
between them. Kuhn is less emphatic on this point, forwarding the idea of incommensurability,
and yet saying only that paradigms are always "slightly at cross-purposes," hereby intimating that
he perhaps doesn't quite buy his own theory. But, as Kuhn has defined them, I see no reason to
deny paradigms full incommensurability by virtue of the feature described above. The possibility
of overlap is simply eliminated.
Hence, if Kuhn's picture of science is taken to be essentially correct, then Kuhn has
succeeded in undermining the traditional conception of scientific endeavor in crucial ways. First,
there can be no theory-neutral observational base upon which to ground assessments of theories~
second, the rational standards ofjustification posited by the traditional view disappear. According
to Kuhn, such standards can only exist within a given paradigm, and cannot be appealed to when
considering two competing paradigms. Moreover, these two considerations mean that science
cannot be cumulative as new paradigms are incompatible with the ones they replace, and cannot
therefore be built upon their predecessors.
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It should now be clear that Kuhn rejects the possibility of theory neutral observation and

of the sorts of extra-paradigmatic rational standards ofjustification forwarded by a traditional
view. As a result, Kuhn also denies that science is cumulative. And, it follows from this that
science is not strictly the pursuit of theories which correspond to reality. In fact, normal science
merely accepts that such theories are already in place, and is more concerned with work that can
only be done within an existing set a theories.

Kuhn and coherence
Theories of truth concern the truth of statements, or propositions; they are designed to
explain first, what it is for a statement to be true, and second, how ascriptions of truth are to be
applied. It is important to distinguish between these two types of explanation even though it may
appear as though the methods by which truth is assigned must crucially depend upon how truth is
defined. While such a link seems intuitively correct, it need not necessarily be the case that the
definitional explanation of the concept oftruth be of the same kind as an explanation of how to
apply the concept. These two types of explanation need not necessarily be one and the same. For
example, litmus paper tests for acidity, but it does not help define it.
Kuhn's characterization of paradigms and normal science has interesting epistemic
applications that suggest an argument for a coherence theory of truth as the criterion for ascribing
truth to statements. To the extent that theory determines how raw perception is organized into
conscious observations, theory determines how we categorize the world. Consequently, the
world is accessible as the subject of our thoughts, desires, beliefs and actions only as a world
created by theory. This being the case, a notion of truth, which is a property of our statements
about the world, is substantively employable only when characterized in terms of coherence to
some paradigm, or world view. In so much as determining the truth or falsity of statements and
beliefs is a substantive, meaningful activity employed daily in order that we might function
effectively in the world, we employ truth as a tool for achieving our goals and avoiding error, and
to be generally successful in our various pursuits.
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Moreover, in this active employed sense, truth is best characterized as coherence because,
in order to be thus employed, truth must be situated as theory-bound, alongside the observations,
beliefs and activities to which truth applies.
As for the commonly accepted alternative theory of truth as correspondence, there may be
a sense in which statements about the world are true just when they accurately reflect how the
world really is, but this is not the same concept employed to assign truth to statements. Such a
criteria of truth is useless, as we have no direct access to the reality to which such truth would
correspond, and could never fulfill the requirements of our criterion, and never be in a position to
judge a statement to be true.
Also, even prior to Kuhnian considerations, correspondence provides a relatively poor
account of how truth is to be assigned. According to the theory, deciding whether or not a given
statement is true involves an investigation of the relevant facts in order to assess the level of
agreement between statements and the reality they are supposed to represent. This methodology
has many serious problems. It is not possible to check the facts of statements made about the
past, or of statements that are universal in application. The facts of yesterday are simply not
available, and it is impossible to check every instance of a universally applied proposition.
Correspondence as a criteria for assigning truth has serious problems regardless of whether or not
direct access to the world can be had.
These criticisms of the criteria of correspondence suggest a parallel argument in favor of
coherence. Just as the actual facts of the past are inaccessible, our beliefs about these facts are
readily available for comparison and evaluation. Likewise, a coherence methodology of truth
ascription also eliminated the necessity of investigating every instance of a universally applied
theory.
Kuhn's work also places coherence in a position to handle one stock objection to
coherence theories in general. It has been objected that two individuals, with different set of
coherent beliefs, or different paradigms, could consistently and coherently hold opposite beliefs.
Person A might believe proposition P and person B might believe proposition ~P. Both beliefs

•
12

would cohere with each persons set of beliefs, thus proposition P would be both true and not true,
thereby constituting a contradiction.
A Kuhnian coherence model can respond to this objection in two ways. First, because of
the incommensurability of the two sets of beliefs, the proposition in question could not be
comparable. The content of person A's proposition P would be different from the content of
person B 's proposition P; there would be no contradiction because P would not be the same
proposition for both A and B. This is part of what it means to say that they have different
paradigms. Secondly, even if it were admitted that the exact same proposition could be judged
true by one person and false by another, this is not a contradiction. Truth as coherence merely
assigns truth to statements, it does not say anything about the way the world really is.
Contradictory truth ascriptions certainly do not entail a contradiction in reality.
Hence, there are two characterizations of truth: truth as correspondence and truth as
coherence. This dichotomous characterization is consistent with the dichotomous 'reality' in
which we exist; one exists mind-independently, and one is 'created' by theory. The point is that
truth as coherence most accurately describes the criterial concept of truth that we, as conscious,
theory-bound agents necessarily employ.
This does not discount the validity of truth as correspondence as the proper definitional
component of a comprehensive theory of truth; there may be some sense in which true statements
are true just in light of the fact that they accurately describe the world. But, truth as such as no
causal, or substantive efficacy; in accordance with Kuhn, truth as correspondence is in fact
epistemically inert, and should therefore be abandoned in favor of the only conception of truth
which we actively employ when assigning truth to statements. Truth as coherence to some
paradigm is the only view consistent with our usage.
In terms of the traditional view of science and knowledge, Kuhn's arguments, if accepted,
refute the tenets which constitute the traditional analysis, and also refute the epistemic model
motivated by these tenets. Realism survives, although this too might fall under a more radical
interpretation. Without theory-neutral observation and rational standards ofjustification that hold
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across paradigms, the motivation for the resulting correspondence criterion of truth is destroyed.
Kuhn's work also simultaneously creates a compelling picture of science that becomes the basis
for a coherence theory of truth ascription, which is uniquely positioned to handle objections to
coherence in a new and more convincing fashion.
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Knowledge comes in many forms: the common knowledge that snow is white and grass
green; slightly lesser known facts such as the atomic weight of silver; personal knowledge of
headaches, appointments, and so on; even the time of day, which changes with every passing
second is knowledge taken for granted by most. But exactly how it is that persons come to know
the color of grass or snow, whether the light is red or green, how much money is left in the
checking account and the like, is still the subject of much philosophic debate. When are we
correctly judged to have knowledge? What peculiar feature is had by some of our beliefs such
that these constitute knowledge while other beliefs do not?
Justified true belief has long been the basis for theories of knowledge and enjoys a central
historical position. Moreover, truth, as it applies to the content of our beliefs, alongside the
beliefs themselves, are often secondary, or incidental, in epistemic discussions. The meat of the
matter traditionally comes down to the analysis ofjustification. Consequently, theories of
knowledge have historically been concerned largely with deontological considerations such as
epistemic duty and obligation. This view is called epistemic "internalism." On this account, one
mustn't run around accepting beliefs willy-nilly. Beliefs must be carefully monitored, subjected to
rigorous justificatory tests, and truth discerned and ascribed accordingly. While we perhaps
cannot be blamed for whatever fleeting beliefs pass through the landscape of our consciousness,
the internalist claims we must surely be held accountable for which of these we hold up as knowl
edge. Hence the ancient and all too common rebuke, ''He should have known better."
Here we see the core of epistemic internalism: knowledge is a matter of upholding
epistemic duty, it is a matter of actively engaging our obligation to the truth by pursuing
knowledge with a stringent adherence to justification. Hence, the attainment of knowledge is
largely internal to us cognizers. If we view our beliefs with the proper critical eye, if we pursue
the truth, then knowledge will be ours. The central claim that justification, and therefore
knowledge, are intimately and crucially linked to aspects internal to the cognizer dominates the
works of most philosophers from Plato to Descartes and Locke, continuing to the present day.
This certainly sounds very attractive. Internalism provides for a brand of optimistic autonomy

-

2

that may help us sleep a little better at night. Under the umbrella of internalism, broadly
construed, the power to attain knowledge is firmly within our grasp and, with diligence and care,
we may avoid error and rest assured that knowledge can be had.
Despite this comforting, although laborious, conception of knowledge, recent years have
seen a partial rejection of internalism and the traditional deontological notions that motivate it.
All internalist analyses of knowledge have fallen prey to effective counterexamples, and
philosophers have consequently turned to epistemic "externalism" as a possible alternative. Such
theories are driven by the idea that there must be some causal or reliable link, external to the
cognizer, between beliefs and their corresponding facts in the world if knowledge is to obtain.
Externalists assert that mere adherence to epistemic duties is not enough to produce knowledge.
Rather, on this analysis, what is most important is that connection, however characterized, that
holds between agent and fact which must obtain to make our beliefs true. Instead of talk about
duties and obligations, externalists concentrate on reliable mechanisms and nomological relations
between beliefs and the world. For the classical externalist, we need know nothing about the
justification of our beliefs for them to constitute knowledge.
This may sound like a mere academic shift in emphasis: remember, we did agree that, of
course, our beliefs must be true in order to qualify as knowledge. But such an assessment is too
hasty. The crux ofthe division between internalists and externalists is not simply which part of
the justified- true-belief equation is most important. Epistemology is supposed to tell us more
than what knowledge is; it's greater purpose is prescriptive, not descriptive. When one realizes
this, the debate becomes deeper, and the gulf between internalist and externalist widens. On the
one hand, the internalist prescription is hard epistemic work and diligence: uphold the standards
ofjustification and ye shall be rewarded. On the other hand...well, whatever the positive
externalist program, how well we maintain our standards ofjustification has perhaps little or
nothing to do with what knowledge we take home at the end of the day. Here the externalist
position faces the risk of running our epistemic project aground in a fatalistic muck. Ifknowledge
is more the result of an external relation than ofthe consequences of our internal conduct, then
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what is left for us to do? The externalist program is in danger of stripping away the autonomy of
rational agents with regard to knowledge, despite our powerful internalist intuitions.
The externalist's problem, then, should not only be investigating the nature of the
supposed epistemic connection in the analysis of knowledge between belief and belief-producing
reality, but it must also provide us with a program for actively improving and maintaining our
epistemic lot in life. Without such a program, externalism necessarily subverts its own epistemic
cause and leaks away into some other discipline, maybe metaphysics, but certainly not
epistemology.
Internalism has routinely failed to produce a satisfactory account of knowledge, largely
due to externalist criticisms. But these criticisms, which are also the motivation for positive
externalist accounts, leave externalists with a fatalistic approach to knowledge that is just as
unsatisfactory as the earlier tradition. It remains to be seen if an externalist theory can
accommodate the autonomy we, as rational agents, must demand of a complete analysis of
knowledge.
A promising recent externalist theory is offered by Alvin Plantinga, who adopts a
naturalistic, externalist approach in response to the continued failure of both traditional internalist
accounts and more recent strains of externalism. A careful assessment ofPlantinga's account
offers, I will argue, an analysis of knowledge that, with certain necessary adjustments, provides an
account that is sufficiently externalist to avoid internalist problems, while steering clear of the
fatalism inherent in other externalist accounts.

Plantinga and Proper Function

Plantinga's theory of knowledge is externalist because it relies upon access to the world.
Plantinga's book, Warrant: The Current Debate, begins by establishing the concept of "warrant,"
defined as "that...which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere
true belief' (WeD, 3). Rather than endorse the conception of knowledge asjustified-true-belief,
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with the addition of a fourth condition to satisfy Gettier problems, Plantinga abandons intemalism
altogether in favor of an essentially extemalist notion based upon what he considers to be the
most important, and most neglected, "epistemic value:" properly functioning cognitive faculties

(WPF, 3).
Plantinga finds that on each intemalist theory, be it classical intemalism, or some fonn of
coherentism, the epistemic value that cannot be accommodated is the proper function of those
faculties involved in belieffonnation, such as perception, memory, reasoning powers, and the like.
Plantinga faults existing extemalist accounts, such as reliabilism, for the same exclusion.
According to Plantinga, a dutiful internalist and a reliable externalist can both satisfy all respective
conditions for knowledge and still lack warrant. The reason, in Plantinga's view, is the possibility
of cognitive malfunction, which no current theory takes into consideration. If our mental faculties
are not working as they ought, we'll never be judged to have knowledge no matter how hard we
work at it, nor will the proper relation between us and the world be enough to ensure epistemic
success.
Once identified as the missing element, proper function of cognitive faculties is the core of
Plantinga's positive account of knowledge in Warrant and Proper Function. Of course, properly
functioning faculties, although perhaps necessary, are far from sufficient to provide warrant,
which, when added to true belief, yields knowledge. As Plantinga notes, we often consider our
faculties to be in perfect working order, and yet many of our beliefs certainly do not count as
knowledge. Plantinga thus derives three additional criteria that, taken together, are supposed to
provide a complete set of necessary and sufficient conditions for warranted belief.
Plantinga's fleshed out theory is as follows:

S is warranted in believing a proposition P iff P is fonned by:
(i) properly functioning cognitive faculties that are,
(ii) functioning within a cognitive environment close to that for which they
were designed,
(iii) aimed at truth, and
(iv) in some sense reliable.
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A belief is warranted for me if and only if, in addition to my cognitive faculties working as they
ought (i.e. are functioning properly), I am within a cognitive environment that is appropriate for
the design of those faculties. This condition is necessary to rule out those instances of belief
formation during which my faculties, while internally functional, are nonetheless hindered by the
environment in which I find myself. For example, although I have 20/20 vision, I cannot trust my
eyes when I am in a completely dark room, or 30 meters underwater, or perhaps upon the surface
of some foreign planet where only the invisible part of the light spectrum is available. In these
instances, despite the fact that all my cognitive faculties might be performing perfectly, my beliefs
would certainly not be warranted. Also, beliefs must be formed by those cognitive faculties which
are aimed at truth. This is to exclude those belief forming mechanisms that, when functioning
properly, are designed to benefit us in some other manner. For example, wishful thinking, which
is arguably a faculty, might benefit us by creating false beliefs which keep us from becoming
depressed over say, a terminal illness. This faculty is not eligible to generate warrant as it is not
designed to produce true beliefs. Only faculties with this specific purpose, such as the ability to
reason, can be the basis for warrant. Lastly, one's cognitive faculties must be in some sense
reliable, which is to say that the design of one's faculties must be a good one.
All of the aforementioned conditions have been subsequent to Plantinga's primary criteria:
properly functioning faculties. But, it is not yet clear what exactly is meant by 'proper function. '
To explicate this concept, Plantinga introduces the idea of a design plan. He conceives of
cognitive faculties as being like artifacts in so much as they must have a designer whose intentions
determine what their function or purpose is, and what 'design plan' will result in the achievement
of those ends. Plantinga writes that, essentially, "in the central and paradigm cases, design plans
do indeed involve a thing's having been designed by one or more conscious designers who are
aiming at an end of some sort... " (wpF, 21). In the case of humans, Plantinga posits God or, less
attractive to himself, the evolutionary process of natural selection as possible designers of the
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proper functions of human beings, (I will hereafter consider only natural selection as designer).
On either view, Plantinga establishes the basis for the idea of a human design plan, which must be
a good one if warrant is to exist.
This design plan, according to Plantinga, is a set of specifications that delineate how a
thing will respond to certain circumstances so as to conform to the functions intended by the
designer. For example, a properly functioning home furnace will kick on or off in order to
maintain a preset temperature. When the temperature drops below a certain level, the furnace
turns on. Hence, the design plan of an artifact can be described as a finite set of "circumstance,
response, purpose or function triples" (wpF, 22) In the above example, the temperature is the
circumstance, the turning on or off the response, and the maintenance of a preset temperature is
the function. Plantinga holds that this notion of a design plan applies to human cognitive faculties
as well, such that every natural cognitive mechanism can be said to have a function in accordance
with the purposes of the evolutionary process (or God). And this purpose determines the design
plan, which in tum delineates how our cognitive faculties should operate. Under Plantinga's
account of proper function, then, cognitive faculties are indiscernible from other natural functions
such as the pumping of blood, or the process of digestion.
At this point, we are in a position to assess Plantinga's account in terms of our primary
prescriptive epistemic goals. What, according to Plantinga, are we to do in order to maximize the
number of beliefs which count as knowledge? The answer is not explicitly clear, but it seems to
be along the following lines. Decide which faculties meet Plantinga's conditions, and accept only
those beliefs produced accordingly as warranted. Whatever remains, while perhaps useful in other
circumstances, is not to count as knowledge. This seems straightforward enough, but there is still
some fine tuning to be done before a final assessment can be made. First, we need to clarify
Plantinga's notion of proper function. To do this, I will introduce the work of Larry Wright, who
formalizes a definition of functions.
Wright identifies two types of functions, natural and conscious. Wright defines natural
functions as '1he common organismic ones such as the function of the heart" (Wright,142). He
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describes these by stating that ''the natural function of something--say, an organ in an organism--is
the reason the organ is there by invoking natural selection. If an organ has been naturally
selected-for by virtue of something it does, we can say that the reason the organ is there is that it
does that something. Hence we can say animals have kidneys because they eliminate metabolic
waste..." (Wright, 142). It is important to note here that natural selection is a slow process,
occurring across generations, and therefore a rather unique designer, with survival as its intended
purpose. These things take time. For example, way back when, the taller amongst the giraffe
ancestors supposedly got more food, lived longer, and were able to pass on their tall genes...fast
forward a few millennia...and today all giraffes are quite tall. What is crucial to understand is that
what can only be called a biological idiosyncrasy back then, is properly called a natural function in
modern giraffes by virtue of the extensive selection process that, over the years, turned a few long
necked beasts into an evolved species of all long-necked giraffes. Natural functions require an
historical precedent, and that precedent has its basis in survival, or the passing on of genes. Thus
we can formulate an analysis of natural functions as follows:
N: For any organism S, with attribute X, X has the natural function Y iff X has been
naturally selected-for across generations because X accomplishes Y.
Contrast this account of natural functions with Wright's characterization of conscious
functions: these "commonly (although not necessarily) involve artifacts, such as the telephone..."
(Wright, 142). Conscious functions, like the sorts of things that usually possess them, are
radically different from their natural counterparts. First, the purpose of a conscious function can
be just about anything--there's one for every human artifact. Telephone's have the function of
communication, cars have the function of transportation, picture frames of decoration, etc. These
common artifacts represent one aspect or type of conscious function. We, human artisans,
specifically craft bits of our world out of raw material for various express purposes. This is the "if
you build it, they will come" approach to functions. Lets call it C:
C: a thing X, has the conscious function Y iffY is the reason X is there, and Y is
accomplished because ofX.
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But, as alluded to in Wright's earlier quote, this is not necessarily the only way conscious
functions come about. Sometimes we stumble across things that already fit some purpose of ours
without any modification whatsoever. Think of these as belonging to the "ready to wear"
approach to functions. For example, rocks make great paper weights, and can function as such if
we decide to employ as such, even though no one designed them that way. Or, a better example,
drawn from Wright's paper, the damaged assembly line. Wright describes an assembly line which
acquires, quite by accident, a ripple in its belt which somehow detects all and only those items
which it carries along that are defective in some way. No one designed it, but certainly the
prudent factory owner would not replace the belt, and would probably take pains to preserve it.
We can now amend C so as to accommodate this type of function as well. Let's call this C*:
C*: X has the conscious function Y iff Y is accomplished because of X, and X is actively
selected-for maintained by a designer for the purpose of accomplishing Y.
In these special cases, a thing's function is independent of its physical organization; in fact, such
items might be completely "un-designed" in this respect, owing their physical organization to no
design or pre-intention whatsoever, as with the completely non-artifactual yet invaluable
rock/paper weight. What crucially separates C* from N is that conscious functions are
non-historical. Things with conscious functions do not need ancestors, things with natural
functions do.
Returning to Plantinga, we can situate his properly functioning cognitive faculties in
Wright's more sophisticated framework. Plantinga tells us that our cognitive mechanisms get the
functions relevant to warrant, i.e. natural functions, from natural selection. So these functions
must be historical, having developed across generations. Further, if the functions associated with
warrant are natural functions, then the same must be the case for the belief fonning functions had
by our various cognitive mechanisms. Thus, a cognitive mechanism produces warranted beliefs
according to Plantinga's account only when such mechanisms have, as the relevant epistemic
function, an historical, natural function.
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Problems in Plantinga's Account

I will argue in this section that Plantinga mistakenly ascribes the natural functions of our
cognitive mechanisms as those functions producing warrant. Instead, I contend that those
warrant producing functions are properly conceived of as socially created conscious functions.
But, before I argue for such an ascription, let us consider a well-worn counter-example to
Plantinga's account that, with a little tinkering, illustrates why the warrant producing functions
cannot be natural functions.
The original counter~example is accredited by Plantinga to William Hasker, and asks us to
imagine a person who undergoes a random genetic mutation resulting in a new biological
mechanism which happens to produce true beliefs in a reliable fashion. Hasker and others have
argued that beliefs formed by such a mechanism would be judged by us to be warranted even
though the mechanism in question is nowhere provided for in any original design plan, thus
making Plantinga's condition of proper function in accordance with a design plan unnecessary. I
wish to take a slightly different tack and examine this example in greater detail.
Imagine someone, let's call him Peter, who wakes up one morning and discovers that he is
totally deaf But, Peter also finds himself experiencing a new type of tactile sensation through his
skin which is amazingly interpretable by Peter as sound. In effect, Pete's ears are now useless
flaps, but his skin has become sensitive to sound vibrations to the extent that he is able to process
inputs through the skin and form appropriate beliefs based upon these inputs. He 'knows', for
example, when the phone rings and, upon answering, is able to correctly identify the caller and
carry on a conversation.
Now, on that first morning, are the beliefs which Peter forms based upon his new faculty
judged by us to be warranted? Clearly not. First, he would have no way of determining the
reliability of the new mechanism; in fact he could not confirm that he had acquired a new
mechanism at all. Pete's new tactile/auditory experiences would have to be categorized along
with other unproved phenomena such as telepathy or ESP. Now suppose that these experiences

10

persist, and suppose further that Peter rushes himself to Johns-Hopkins for testing. After months
of extensive investigation, a team of experts from around the world concludes that his new
experiences are the result of a legitimate, reliable biological mechanism resulting from a random
genetic mutation. Now do we judge that Pete's beliefs based upon this new faculty as warranted?
At this point they clearly would be, having been sanctioned by the experts as reliable.
But, and this is the problem for Plantinga, in what sense does this mechanism have a
natural function? What would it be for the new mechanism to function properly or improperly? It
cannot be that the new mechanism has a natural function of the sort posited by Plantinga because
it is nowhere specified in Peter's original design plan and cannot therefore have a natural function.
Plantinga argues that Pete simply got a new design plan. Remembering Wright's point, however,
this is not an option. Natural functions require mechanisms with ancestors, while Pete's mutation
has none. This is where Plantinga's theory breaks down. According to Plantinga, who only
considers natural functions, there is no way of assigning any function, much less a proper one, to
Pete's ahistorical mechanism.
Yet it seems intuitively correct to say that his new faculty does have a function--it
provides reliable sense data about sounds, producing true beliefs about the environment. It
further seems quite plausible to think of this faculty as functioning properly or improperly.
Maybe, for example, it is the case that Peter's new "hearing" is impeded ifhis skin gets too dry,
distorting the sense data. On occasions like this, his faculty would be functioning improperly.
But from where does this function ascription derive?
We need not abandon Peter or Plantinga entirely. Let's rejoin Pete as he leaves
Johns-Hopkins with the knowledge that the new mechanism is reliable. I contend that at this
point, the mechanism still has no function. It is simply that, a mechanism. But Pete, as a sentient
human being, has many epistemic goals--to form true beliefs, to avoid false beliefs, etc. He is now
in a position, thanks to the experts at Johns-Hopkins, to reflect upon these goals, calculate the
effectiveness of his new mechanism at achieving these goals, and epistemically recruit his new
mechanism for the purpose of fulfilling them. At this point, his new mechanism can properly be
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said to have a function--a conscious function, of the C* variety mentioned above, assigned by him
to a natural mechanism for the purpose of achieving his own self-determined epistemic goals.
I further assert that, with regard to producing warranted beliefs, all cognitive faculties
should be characterized as involving conscious functions in much the same way. One might argue
against this position as follows: "Hey, Pete's funky skin is one thing, but as for the rest of us, our
cognitive mechanisms are not random mutations, and they did evolve." I will not disagree. I will
only say that, whatever the natural functions of those processes or mechanisms which we might
describe as mental, these are completely independent of any conscious functions we may choose
to put upon them. Moreover, in so much as our mental lives involve functions of producing
warranted true beliefs, such functions are conscious.
Returning once again to natural selection, which we have established as the only source of
a natural function, we must remember that natural functions are simply not in the business of
belief ascription. If a function is to be natural, it must also be purely survivalistic.
Certainly our mental faculties do have the purpose of aiding in survival by allowing us to
act in our own best interests and avoid bodily danger. Our cognitive faculties help us avoid
enemies, find food, procure shelter and locate mates; but these activities are not the direct
purpose of cognitive faculties, in so far as those faculties are viewed as having warrant production
as their goal. Thus, the germane purposes of cognitive faculties are epistemic, not survivalistic.
Moreover, natural selection holds no epistemic purposes; these are the domain of human
cognizers, who determine their own epistemic goals. This is why cognitive functions must be
conscious, as their corresponding purposes are epistemic goals held by the cognizant community.
A few brief examples illustrate this point. Consider the faculty of perception. While the
visual apparatus is a natural mechanism, the function of vision, in so far as that function is to form
true beliefs, is not natural. Forming true beliefs about the world is a conscious human purpose
which, while intimately connected to survival, is not synonymous with survival; in so far as
perception has only the purpose of forming true beliefs, it cannot be the purpose of natural
selection. Contrast perception with the function of the kidneys. This function is properly a
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natural function because its direct and immediate purpose is survival, as opposed to the human
purpose of forming true beliefs. Processing metabolic waste is something that bodies do, forming
true beliefs is something that cognizers do; thus it follows that the functions assigned to these
activities must conform to the author of their intended purposes, one natural and the other
conscious.
I offer one final illustration of a biological mechanism with a clear conscious function for
two reasons. The first, to drive home arguments already made, and the second, to remind us of
why we embarked upon this epistemic odyssey in the first place. Due to an injury years ago, my
left knee aches in the hours before it rains. While my aching knee is not a one hundred percent
accurate indicator of rain--it often fails to ache when it rains and sometimes aches for no reason
whatsoever--it could have been that it were completely accurate and reliable. Assuming this were
the case, and I my knee ached if and only if it were going rain, would my knee have acquired an
additional function? It certainly could not be a natural function; aching-before-rain is not a useful
natural mechanism, but rather an unpleasant side effect of injury. Such a phenomenon serves
absolutely no natural purpose, and would by no means qualify as a natural function. But, it is
reasonable to assert that my knee could take on a conscious function. Maybe I am a
meteorologist, or a storm-chaser, or maybe I tend the courts at Wimbledon Stadium. Surely, the
fact that my knee is one hundred percent accurate at indicating when it will rain fulfills a primary
personal epistemic goal. Under these circumstances, I would certainly consider my knee as
having the function of rain prediction; and this function would be of conscious origins, not
natural.
In so much as their direct and immediate function is the formation of true beliefs, cognitive
faculties are conscious functions in exactly the same way. The fact that such faculties are not the
result of random genetic mutations or old sports injuries is incidental. Human beings establish
what their epistemic goals should be and employ cognition as a means to these ends, regardless of
any natural origins which may in fact obtain.
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Conclusions

That Plantinga incorrectly counts cognitive faculties among natural functions results in an
inadequacy in his theory which explains why it cannot handle the type of counter- example
described above. It need not be the case that proper function be described purely in tenns of
historical natural functions which are the work the evolutionary process (or God). Either of these
might be considered as having provided the raw natural and cognitive mechanisms responsible for
the existence of those cognitive faculties. These are then employed by us to assure that, to the
extent possible, our beliefs are warranted; but the proper or improper function of such faculties
results from a conscious design plan, namely that epistemic plan which every cognizer sets for
herself concerning her own epistemic goals. We have now saved externalism from fatalism. Here
is the prescriptive aspect externalism seemed to lack.

As for Plantinga, his theory of warrant can now be refonnulated in tenns of conscious
functions, rather than natural functions.

S is warranted in believing a proposition P iffP is fonned by cognitive faculties that are:
(i) functioning properly in accordance with conscious functional ascriptions,
(ii) functioning within a cognitive environment close to that for which they
were designed,
(iii) aimed at truth, and
(iv) in some sense reliable.

The facelift is descriptively minor, but prescriptively huge. His design plan should be not so much
a blueprint of human natural mechanisms--Ieave that to the scientific community, or at least to the
metaphysicians. Rather, Plantinga should focus on what is truly the realm of the epistemologist:
an epistemic inquiry into a set of nonnative, yet scientifically grounded guidelines delineating what
epistemic purposes we ought to pursue, and what cognitive faculties we ought to employ towards

...
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those ends. Now we can save Plantinga and the rest of the externalists from fatalism and still
maintain their essentially non-intemalist flavor.
The original dilemma was how to save an externalist account without making it a fatalistic
one. Plantinga's account, reformulated, accomplishes this. Although our brains must be in the
right relation to the world in order to produce true beliefs, it is up to us as individual cognizers to
sort through our mental capabilities and delineate those faculties which fit our episternic needs and
decide how best to employ them.
This is the project of epistemology. Plantinga would seem to implicitly agree here, as his
conditions for warrant aside from properly functioning cognitive faculties regard such instances
when we ought not to trust our cognitive mechanisms based upon what we know of how they
work.
Such an enterprise is most properly the project of the epistemologist, whose concerns
should not only be a description of how we know what we know; but more importantly, what
types of episternic purposes we ought to have and what actions are most likely to achieve those
ends. Both components are integral to a complete analysis of knowledge. I suggest that an
account like Plantinga's, properly reformulated, can ease the tension between eternalism and
internalism by addressing the problems and preserving the positive theoretical aspects of both.
Such an account yields an analysis of knowledge that acknowledges the crucial link between the
cognizer and her relationship to the environment in which beliefs are formed, while lending equal
credence to the basic intuition that rational agents can actively exert control regarding the pursuit
and maintenance of knowledge.
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